LIBERALS AND ISLAMISTS
By Shadi Hamid
1It’s not easy being a liberal in the Arab world; you are doomed to face frustration on election day. In a religiously conservative country like Egypt, it is difficult for liberal parties — which often lack deep local networks and grassroots support — to win in free elections. But even under the increasingly heavy handed rule of President Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood allies, liberals had a chance to work within the system to counterbalance Morsi. Most liberals opted not to meet that challenge and supported the June 2012 dissolution of Egypt’s democratically elected parliament. And when the military deposed Morsi on July 3, most backed that move too. “It was a painful decision,” said Mohamed ElBaradei, Egypt’s most prominent liberal politician, who has taken the position of acting Vice President in the new military backed government. “It was outside the legal framework, but we had no other choice.”
2The liberal chorus that supported Morsi’s expulsion argues it is sometimes necessary to put democracy on pause in order to save it. That’s an old story. In Algeria, liberals largely stood by — or actively cheered on — as the military aborted the country’s 1992 elections when Islamists were poised to win, provoking a bloody civil war that would rage for years. Algerian democracy remains paused to this day. Yet, many liberals across the Arab world fear, even hate, Islamists more than they are willing to believe in democracy.
3 In the Egyptian context, the word liberal is often used as a general term for people who don’t like Islamists. It is unclear what liberalism really means in a country like Egypt, where many who would self identify as liberal engage in army worship or believe Islamist parties should be banned from even contesting elections in the first place. On the other hand, Islamists have a distinctive worldview — and a project for transforming the individual and society in accordance with Islamic law. Liberals and Islamists have become ever more ideologically divided in the Arab Spring countries.
4 Take the situation in which Tunisia’s Ennahda party finds itself, especially since the recent assassinations of two leftist politicans have threatened to block the democratic transition. The Islamist party has avoided many of the mistakes of its Egyptian counterparts. It has governed in coalition with two secular parties, withdrawn references to Islamic law in the draft constitution, and has done very little that could be considered extremist. Yet Tunisia’s liberals routinely accuse Ennahda of being hidden radicals waiting for the right moment to implement an extremist agenda.
5 Many Egyptian liberals have given way to their fears, leading them to embrace a military hungry for control. The new order has quickly proved more repressive than the Morsi government ever was during its one year in power. The Ministry of Interior has announced the reinstatement of departments to monitor political and religious activism. And Egyptians have just seen what happens when protesters defy the military; security forces shot dead at least 140 Morsi supporters on July 8 and July 27.
6 Just after the coup, ElBaradei declared: “[The army] has no interest in taking a forward role in politics.” Such talk now looks absurd.
Adapted from Time, August 12, 2013
According to the information in the article, Egypt’s liberals, in general,
a) can win democratic political victories only with the support of Egypt’s military
b) have lost most of the widespread support that the great mass of Egyptians had once given them.
c) chose not to set up a democratic opposition to President Mohamed Morsi.
d) have continued to support Egypt’s democratically elected parliament while, at the same time, being opposed to President Mohamed Morsi.
e) remained neutral when President Mohamed Morsi was removed from power by Egypt’s military.
